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 or years, there has been a growing controversy 
over the wisdom and constitutionality of state and local 
tax incentives designed to encourage businesses to locate or 
substantially increase their operations in a state.  
State and local officials, as well as multistate businesses, often 
say these incentives are crucial to bolstering economic development 
in their area, while others contend these incentives amount to 
discriminatory state taxation favoring in-state over out-of-state 
investment in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
With every state in the nation offering some type of tax incen-
tive to encourage in-state economic development and with law-
suits across the nation testing the validity of these efforts, many 
are calling for clearer guidelines from Congress regarding the 
matter. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent dismissal of the 
challenge to Ohio’s tax incentives in Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, 
on the ground that the taxpayers did not have “standing” to 
bring the suit, has done nothing to resolve the underlying sub-
stantive question of the incentives’ constitutionality.  
F
One taxpayer’s economic 
development incentive  
is often another’s  
discriminatory tax
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Why Congress should draw a 
line between appropriate eco-
nomic development incentives 
and inappropriate state tax 
discrimination
It is not an overstatement to charac-
terize the U.S. Supreme Court’s dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine imposing 
restraints on state taxation of interstate com-
merce as a “quagmire.” 
Indeed, almost half a century ago the 
U.S. Supreme Court itself described the 
doctrine that way,1 and things have not got-
ten much better.2
Moreover, in no context is the confu-
sion and uncertainty created by the court’s 
Commerce Clause doctrine more profound 
than in the domain of state tax incentives for 
economic development. 
As I testified last year before a House sub-
committee looking into the Cuno problem,3 
perhaps the one point on which virtually 
all observers would agree is that “the law in 
this area is indeterminate” and that, “[l]less 
charitably put, it is a mess, albeit a mess 
that keeps many lawyers and law professors 
busy.”4 
The Cuno case, of course, is a poster child 
for this “mess.” How can anyone explain, as 
the Cuno case held, how (a) an income tax 
credit to attract business to a state violates 
the Commerce Clause while (b) a property 
tax abatement to attract that same business 
to the state does not?5   But Cuno is just the 
tip of the iceberg. 
Important questions
There are literally hundreds of state tax 
incentives enacted for economic develop-
ment purposes that arguably fall on one 
side or the other of the line the court has 
drawn between permissible and impermis-
sible inducements. Whether they fall on 
the right side or the wrong side of the line 
depends on an inquiry into such questions 
as whether the measure is: 
•  a permissible direct subsidy of domes-
tic industry that "'does not ordinarily 
run afoul' of the negative Commerce 
Clause"6; or 
•  an incentive falling within the court's 
recognition that its decisions "do[ ] 
not prevent the States from structur-
ing their tax systems to encourage the 
growth and development of intrastate 
commerce and industry"7; or 
•  an incentive designed to achieve that 
same objective - "to encourage the 
growth and development of intrastate 
commerce and industry" - but that 
"forecloses tax-neutral decisions"8; or
•  an incentive that "provid[es] a direct 
commercial advantage to local busi-
ness."9 
Because the answers to these questions 
are often unclear, in many cases it is anyone's 
guess whether a particular economic devel-
opment measure falls on the right or wrong 
side of that line.
For example, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court is struggling with the question of 
whether the state's property tax exemption 
for airlines that operate "hub facilities" in 
the state violates the dormant Commerce 
Clause,10 a question that the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals certified to the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court because it "presents issues of 
statewide and national importance involving 
the ability of the state to provide tax incen-
tives for businesses to locate, upgrade, or 
remain in the state."11
While perhaps not of the same pressing 
importance, except to my state and local tax 
students to whom I gave the problem as an 
examination question last semester, is the 
question of the constitutionality of Georgia's 
headquarters credit for new investment in 
the state.12 I could have chosen a similar 
example from virtually any other state.
Resulting taxation issues
The problem created by this uncertainty 
for taxpayers and taxing authorities alike is 
self-evident. 
Corporate taxpayers who have reason-
ably relied on these economic development 
incentives in the past have no assurance that 
these provisions will survive a Commerce 
Clause challenge and thereby deprive them 
of benefits on which they may have made 
locational and budgetary decisions. 
Moreover, this uncertainty has a highly 
unsettling impact on future decision-making 
regarding industrial location. 
State taxing authorities whose incentive 
provisions may be vulnerable to attack like-
wise face difficult administrative decisions in 
    Walter Hellerstein, the School of Law’s Shackelford Distinguished Professor of Taxation and who is generally regarded as 
the nation’s leading legal academic authority on state and local taxation, was asked to provide testimony on these issues at a 
U.S. Senate hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance earlier this year.  
    Hellerstein also testified on this topic before a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee last year and provided an over-
view of the American debate to the United Kingdom’s Treasury Department, which faces similar issues in relation to Member 
States of the European Union seeking to encourage economic growth and productivity in their respective countries. 
    Below you will find a modified version of Hellerstein’s testimony before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the 
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determining how to redress the discrimina-
tion, especially in light of the constitutional 
requirement that those who have been the 
victim of unconstitutional state tax discrimi-
nation are entitled to “meaningful backward-
looking relief.”13 
The state budgetary implications of this 
requirement can also be daunting. 
Accordingly, wholly apart from any ques-
tion of whether state tax incentives are wise 
as a matter of policy - an issue on which 
others are better positioned to comment and 
to which my testimony is not directed - the 
existing indeterminacy of the law govern-
ing the constitutionality of these incentives 
under the Commerce Clause calls for a 
solution.
Congress should act
That solution will not come from the 
U.S. Supreme Court or from other courts 
that are bound to follow its guidance. As 
Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter observed 
nearly 50 years ago: 
At best, this Court can only act nega-
tively; it can determine whether a 
specific state tax is imposed in viola-
tion of the Commerce Clause. Such 
decisions must necessarily depend on 
the application of rough and ready 
legal concepts. We cannot make a 
detailed inquiry into the incidence of 
diverse economic burdens in order to 
determine the extent to which such 
burdens conflict with the necessities 
of national economic life. Neither 
can we devise appropriate standards 
for dividing up national revenue on 
the basis of more or less abstract 
principles of constitutional law, which 
cannot be responsive to the subtle-
ties of the interrelated economies of 
Nation and State.
The problem calls for solution by 
devising a congressional policy. 
Congress alone can provide for a full 
and thorough canvassing of the mul-
titudinous and intricate factors which 
compose the problem of the taxing 
freedom of the States and the needed 
limits on such state taxing power.14
In short, the problem raised by Cuno is 
broader than Cuno itself.  
Failure by Congress to act on the under-
lying issue raised by Cuno will effectively 
leave us in the “mess” we are in. 
Wholly apart from the wisdom or effec-
tiveness of state tax incentives or the defen-
sibility of various competing readings of 
the dormant Commerce Clause that may 
be advanced, failure by Congress to act will 
assure continuing uncertainty and, most 
probably, inconsistency in judicial determi-
nations of the validity of state tax incen-
tives. 
To reiterate what I said to a House sub-
committee last year: “However Congress 
may resolve the ultimate question of what 
types of tax incentives represent appropriate 
measures to encourage economic develop-
ment, we are all better off if Congress draws 
a clear line that is discernible to all than if we 
are left to the vagaries of the judicial process 
that has created the uncertainty and contro-
versy that we face today.”15 
How Congress should draw 
the line between acceptable 
economic development incen-
tives and unacceptable state 
tax discrimination
If Congress decides to legislate in this 
area and to draw a line between acceptable 
economic development incentives and unac-
ceptable state tax discrimination, my princi-
pal recommendation is simple: be careful. 
I say that for the following reason: one 
person’s “economic development incentive” 
is often another person’s “discriminatory 
tax.” 
New York’s “economic development 
incentive” to attract sales to the New York 
exchanges was a “discriminatory tax” to the 
Boston Stock Exchange that viewed the 
incentive as diverting economic activity from 
the Boston exchange, a view with which the 
U.S. Supreme Court concurred.16
Hawaii’s “economic development incen-
tive” for its fledging wine industry was a 
“discriminatory tax” to sellers of alcoholic 
beverages produced in other states, a view 
with which the U.S. Supreme Court con-
curred.17
New York’s “economic development 
incentive” for businesses involved in export 
shipment from New York was a “discrimina-
tory tax” for those making export shipments 
from other states, a view with which the U.S. 
Supreme Court concurred.18 
And Ohio’s “economic development 
incentive” for gasohol produced in the state 
was a “discriminatory tax” to those who 
produced gasohol in other states, a view with 
which the U.S. Supreme Court concurred.19 
Consequently, in drawing the line 
between acceptable and unacceptable eco-
nomic development incentives, Congress 
must act with great care to assure that it is 
neither approving as “economic develop-
ment incentives” provisions that, on further 
reflection, constitute unwarranted “state tax 
discrimination” nor, alternatively, that it is 
not condemning as “state tax discrimination” 
provisions that, on further reflection, con-
stitute permissible “economic development 
incentives.”
Let me provide you with one recent 
example of the delicate task that Congress 
faces. 
Recently, the Missouri House of 
Representatives passed by a resounding 
152-1 margin an exemption from Missouri 
sales taxes for “all sales of new motor vehicles 
“… we are all better 
off if Congress 
draws a clear line 
that is discernible 
to all than if we are 
left to the vagaries 
of the judicial process 
that has created the 
uncertainty and 
controversy that 
we face today.”
  - Shackelford Professor 
     Walter Hellerstein
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assembled and sold in the state of Missouri 
after January 1, 2007.”20
The bill was obviously enacted with the 
wholly laudable and understandable purpose 
of encouraging economic development in 
Missouri by eliminating the tax on motor 
vehicles assembled in the state. 
But it does not take a Nobel-prize win-
ning economist to appreciate the impli-
cations of this legislation for the sale in 
Missouri of automobiles manufactured in 
Illinois, Ohio or Michigan. 
The question Congress faces, then, is 
how to draw the appropriate line between 
Cuno-type incentives, which many believe 
are appropriate, and the Missouri incentive, 
which, I will venture to presume, many 
would find inappropriate.
Proposed legislation
Without speaking to the merits of the 
particular line that Congress may wish to 
draw, I nevertheless believe that the legisla-
tion introduced into Congress by U.S. Sen.
George V. Voinovich and U.S. Rep. Patrick 
J. Tiberi21 makes an excellent start at the 
process of drawing such a line. 
It represents a considered effort to strike 
a balance between the ability of the states, 
in their sovereign capacities, to adopt pro-
grams designed to attract economic activity 
to the state and the needs of the nation to 
maintain the national common market that 
has been essential to our country’s economic 
prosperity.  
Although I have studiously avoided 
expressing my views as to precisely where 
Congress should draw the line, and I have 
also expressed the view that the proposed 
legislation is in need of some revision, I do 
believe that the proposed legislation, which 
generally authorizes state tax incentives to 
encourage economic development, properly 
excludes the following types of state tax dis-
crimination from its authorization:
•  Tax incentives that favor in-state 
corporations or individual residents. 
•  Tax incentives that penalize out-of-
state activity.
•  Tax incentives that favor the purchase 
of in-state over out-of-state products.
•  Tax incentives conditioned on other 
states offering reciprocal benefits.
•  Tax incentives that require the use of 
locally produced property.  ■
End notes
1  Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959).
2  See generally 1 Jerome R. Hellerstein & Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation ch. 4 (3d ed. 1998 & Cum. Supp. 
2005) (taking more than 300 printed pages to describe the U.S. Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine).
3  Walter Hellerstein, Economic Development and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Lessons of Cuno v. 
DaimlerChrysler and its Effect on State Taxation Affecting Interstate Commerce, Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution and the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005).
4  Id. at 10.
5  Although I must plead guilty to having tried to explain that very distinction, Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. 
Coenen, “Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives,” 81 Cornell Law Review 789 
(1996), and acknowledge the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit relied on that explanation in striking down 
Ohio’s investment tax credit while sustaining the property tax abatement, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc. 386 
F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing id. at 806-09), I would be the first to admit (and have in fact admitted) the 
extraordinary difficulties in attempting to delineate “the ill-defined distinction between the constitutional carrot 
and the unconstitutional stick in state tax, subsidy, and related cases.” Hellerstein & Coenen, supra, at 792.
6  West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 n.15 (1994) (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 
486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).
7  Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977). 
8  Id. at 331. One may reasonably ask whether a tax incentive that does not “foreclose tax-neutral decisions” is even 
worthy of its name, since that is precisely what a tax incentive is designed to do.
9  Id. at 329 (quoting Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959)).
10  Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue, 281 Wis. 2d 117, 697 N.W. 2d 475 (2005).
11  Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue, No. 04-0319, 2005 WL 487882 (Wis. App. 
2005).
12  Here was the question: 
Georgia Code § 48-7-40.17 provides, in pertinent part:
(a)  As used in this Code section, the term: ...
 (3)  “Headquarters” means the principal central administrative office of a taxpayer or a subsidiary of the 
taxpayer.
(b)  A taxpayer establishing its headquarters in this state or relocating its headquarters into this state which:
 (1)  Within one year of the first date on which it withholds wages for employees at such headquarters ... 
employ at least 100 persons in new full-time jobs at such headquarters ... ; or
 (2)  Within one year of the first date on which it withholds wages for employees at such headquarters ... 
incurs within the state a minimum of $1 million in construction, renovation, leasing, or other costs 
related to such establishment or relocation ... shall be allowed a credit for taxes imposed under this 
article equal to $2,500.00 annually per eligible new full-time job.
Your client has recently relocated its headquarters to Georgia. It has added 75 persons in “new full-time jobs at 
such headquarters” within the meaning of the foregoing statute, and it has incurred $500,000 of “construction, 
renovation, leasing, or other costs related to such establishment” within the meaning of the statute. The Georgia 
Department of Revenue has denied your client the credit described above, and your client has asked your advice 
as to whether a Commerce Clause challenge to such denial will be successful. Write a memorandum providing 
the requested advice.
13  McKesson v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 31 (1990).
14  Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting). The Court expressed similar sentiments in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 
(1981) and in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978). 
15  Hellerstein, supra note 4, at 13. 
16  Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
17  Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
18  Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
19  New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
20  House Bill No. 1249, 93rd General Assembly, State of Missouri, March 2, 2006.
21  See S. 1066, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005); H.R. 2471, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005).
